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Abstract
Many of the largest cities in the United States outsource emergency med-
ical services. This paper develops a political economy model of city service
provision. Empirical analysis of emergency ambulances in the 200 largest U.S.
cities nds that a number of variables are signicant determinants of amblu-
ance outsourcing, including the fraction of a citys voters over the age of 65.
This nding provides evidence that interest-group politics are important, and
suggests a particular shape of the contracting cost curve. JEL codes: D23,
D73, H11, H40, L33.
1 Introduction
How will aging baby boomers a¤ect the scope of government? Over the twenty
year period from 2010 to 2030, the percent of the population age 65 or older is
projected to increase by more than half.1 In addition, it is likely that the elderly as a
group enjoy non-trivial inuence on policy.2 This article explores how age and other
Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High Street,
Columbus OH 43210. e-mail: holian.5@osu.edu, web: www.mattholian.com. Special thanks are due
to Don Haurin and Massimo Morelli (co-advisors), and also to Gene Mumy and Trevor Brown,
with no implications. Thanks also to helpful comments from audiences at Ohio State (Columbus,
06), EITM V (Ann Arbor, 06), the Public Choice Societies (Amsterdam, 07), and BGSU (Bowling
Green, 07).
1By 2010 approximately thirteen percent of the U.S. population will be age 65 or older. This
gure is expected to rise to twenty percent by 2030. (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related
Statistics, "Older Americans 2004: Key Indicators of Well-Being." Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing O¢ ce. November 2004.)
2Several studies provide evidence that the elderly are able to successfully target spending towards
their preferences. Poterba (1997, 1998) and Brunner and Balsdon (2004) nd a negative empirical
correlation between public school spending and high numbers of elderly voters. Campbell (2003)
explores the actual processes by which elderly achieve their policy objectives.
1
characteristics of the electorate a¤ect local government leadersdecision of whether
or not to outsource public service provision, using data on emergency ambulances in
the 200 largest U.S. cities.
This chapter also models the outsourcing question by viewing governments as
rms, and looks by analogy to the boundary of the rm problem from industrial
organization (Coase 1937). A number of both positive and normative models of
public service delivery mode have been introduced in the modern branch of this
literature; however there still is no agreed upon political theory of the rm model.3
The present paper extends the probabilistic voting model by building in transaction
cost considerations, using a cost framework similar to that of Levin and Tadelis (2007),
however with a wider parameter space of the contracting cost curve. This di¤erence
yields a number of new predictions coming from the model. These predictions are
put to the test in the empirical section.
The empirical section of this paper focuses on cross-city e¤ects, as opposed to
cross-service factors, and focuses on a single public service, emergency ambulance
service. While this single-service focus may appear limiting, it actually permits
exploring topics that other studies of local government service contracting have been
unable to pursue. Perhaps most important among these topics is the inuence of
interest groups. The elderly are a group for whom emergency ambulance service
is important; this is intuitive, and it also has been documented that the elderly use
emergency ambulances more than other groups.4 Another benet of the single-service
focus is the ability to better control for specic institutional details of the emergency
ambulance service setting.
Emergency ambulance service is the transport component of emergency medical
service (EMS). These are the types of ambulances that respond to "911" calls in
the United States, or "112" calls in the European Union. This particular service
exhibits great variation across cities in whether it is made by the city in house or
outsourced; in the sample presented here, the service is outsourced somewhat more
than half the time. Frequent outsourcing of emergency ambulances is in sharp
contrast to the other core public safety services (policing and re suppression) which
are seldom outsourced. Also, the ambulance data used in this study allows for a
more representative sample of cities. Previous studies used a sample of cities that
are over represented by ones with the council-manager form of government.5
The summary of the theoretical model is as follows. Two political candidates
compete for votes and heterogenous citizens vote for the candidate that promises
them higher utility. The candidate that is elected has two technologies available to
3Examples of formal theory include Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny
(1995) and La¤ont and Tirole (1993). Related empirical work includes Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Levin and Tadelis (2007), and others; see reviews and references in Hirsch (1995),
Mueller (2003), Gerber et al. (2004) and Brown and Potoski (2003).
4For evidence of a positive correlation between use and age, see Gerson and Skvarch (1982) and
Downing and Wilson (2005).
5Brown and Potoski "Learning from experience"
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provide the public good: in-house ("make") technology and outsource ("buy") tech-
nology. Candidates anticipate the available technologies and without any primitive
preference for mode, choose as a platform the level of service and mode of provision
that maximizes their vote share; thus, service level and mode are determined jointly.
In this setting, when groups of individuals have heterogenous tastes for the public
good, demographic shifts can cause the platform that politicians run on to change.
If the public good-loving group increases in size, politicians platforms increase with
respect to service level.6 An increase in service level, in turn, causes the likelihood
of outsourcing to either increase, decrease, decrease at rst and then increase (U-
shaped), or increase at rst and then decrease (inverted U-shaped), depending on the
contracting cost curve shape assumption. In addition to the two hypotheses always
outsource and never outsource, the model generates four additional hypotheses for
how demographic variation a¤ects outsourcing. Results from the empirical section
will help to test among the hypotheses.
The empirical section uses survey data on emergency ambulance provision in the
200 largest U.S. cities, conducted in 1990 and 2000. This data, combined with Cen-
sus data of the basic demographic variables in the model, are used in the baseline
regressions. The full empirical specication also includes data on partisan voting out-
comes, labor market conditions, state legal institutions, and several other variables.
Among the empirical ndings for ambulances are that: public/private wage ratios are
positively correlated to outsourcing likelihood, cities that are in Republican-leaning
counties are more likely to outsource, and while most state laws related to city gov-
ernance do not a¤ect ambulance outsourcing, the presence of laws that forbid cities
from short-term borrowing, and institutional arrangements where states rather than
cities have responsilibity for assessing the value of residential property for taxation
purposes, are both positively correlated with outsourcing. Average housing value,
and especially population are also shown to be signicant predictors of ambulance
outsourcing. Also, the empirical section nds suggestive evidence that di¤erences
exist between how council-manager and mayor-council forms of government respond
to political pressure.
The main correlation of interest, however, is between the percent of citys voting
age population that is elderly and ambulance outsourcing. The results show an
inverted U-shaped correlation. This nding is signicant in both years and holds up in
both the baseline and full empirical specications. The inverted U-shaped correlation
implies the following two features for an urban politics theory of the rm: First, the
variable costs of contracting are convex. As politicians contract for higher levels of
the public service in order to attract the votes of the elderly, contracting costs rise at
an increasing rate, causing the costs of outsourcing to eventually surpass the costs of
in-house provision. This nding provides support for one of Levin and Tadelis(2007)
6To be more precise, an increase in the size of the public good-loving group causes service level
to increase as long as this groups tax base is not too small. This insight is claried in the next
section.
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key assumptions. Second, xed costs to contracting seem to be important as xed
costs, combined with convex variable costs to contracting, implies that outsourcing
will occur for cities choosing moderate service levels, with both low levels and high
levels being produced in-house. From a transaction cost standpoint, the empirical
results highlight the importance of xed contracting costs in the local public service
literature. From a political economy standpoint, the results suggest that interest
group politics are important in considerations with city service outsourcing.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section presents the model,
including its comparative static properties. Section three then presents the empirical
methodology, data and results of the analyses of the 1990 and 2000 data. Section
four concludes with a discussion and summary of the ndings, as well as suggested
directions for future research.
2 Model
This section explores the types of policies that emerge under competition between
two o¢ ce-seeking candidates when candidates have multiple modes of public service
provision at their disposal and voters are heterogenous in their preferences and size
of their tax base. The rst subsection posits the preferences of voters and the
technology by which politicians can turn tax dollars into the public service. The
second subsection explores the probabilistic nature of elections and the platforms
and policies that result from citizen characteristics and other given parameters. The
third subsection explores comparative static properties, especially related to how
demographic shifts a¤ect the probability of outsourcing.
2.1 Preferences and Public Good Production Technology
Consider a city inhabited by a continuum of citizens with a population mass equal to
one. These citizens are indexed by i and each citizen i is a member of only one group
j. There are two groups in society, j 2 fY;Og (for young and old) and each group
makes up j fraction of the population, so that Y +O = 1: Group members share
two things in common. One is their tastes for the public service.7 Specically, each
group member has the same basic quasi-linear preferences over private consumption
c; and the publicly provided service g, which is given by
W j = cj + j ln(g) (1)
where j  0 represents intensity of preference for the public good; this taste
parameter is common to all citizens in group j. Individuals in the same group also
7Of course cities provide an array of goods and services and there are important externalities
across services. The single service assumption here is for simplicity; an extension of this model can
incorporate multiple public services.
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have in common the size of their tax base, represented by yj: For now, interpret yj as
income.8 The public service is nanced by a uniform proportional tax  on income
that is common to all citizens. After tax income is consumed; thus consumption for a
member of group j is given by cj = (1 )yj: Substituting for consumption, equation
(1) becomes
U j(g;  ; j; yj) = (1  )yj + j ln(g) (2)
The production function for the public service is a simple linear transformation
of labor units into units of output, but public service provision must be undertaken
in one of two possible ways, or modes. Denote mode of provision by x. In the
rst mode, the city can provide the public service through the make technology, (in-
house provision) so that x = : In this case the city hires and manages employees.
Alternatively, the city can buy the service (privatized provision) so that x = : In
this case the city contracts with another entity that produces the service. Let the
citys balanced budget equation under in-house provision be given by
y = wg + s (3)
where the superscript  refers to in-house provision mode, or "make". The
proportional tax rate and public service level are now written with a superscript
indicating the mode of provision, as the correspondence between service level and tax
rate, given by the balanced budget equation (3), is now mode dependent. y is the
average tax base, equal to the average tax base (income) in the city (y = jjyj), and
w is the wage that must be paid to a public manager to produce one unit of output.
Finally, s represents the setup costs (xed costs) the city must incur to engage in
production.
The other option for the city is to "buy" the service. Let the balanced budget
equation when the service is contracted-out be given by
y = wg + d(g; r) (4)
The superscript  refers to "buy." w is the wage that must be paid to a private
manager to produce one unit of output. By assumption, w < w; that is a private
companys cost of production is always less than a governments.9 The second
8City governments obtain their revenue from taxes on a variety of sources, including personal
and corporate income taxes, sales and excise taxes. The predominant source of tax revenue are
property taxes. In 1996, property taxes accounted for 74 percent of local government tax revenues,
and sales taxes, personal income taxes and excise taxes accounted for about 15, ve and ve percent
of revenue, respectively (Garrett and Leatherman, 2000). Therefore for some purposes, housing
value is the most important tax base. However, interpreting the tax base as income best reectes
the simple notion that having more of the public good means less of everything else, and that the
size of ones taxes will depend on the size of ones tax base.
9The wages are taken as parameters given to the model, however these relative wages have
microfoundations. See the appendix for the outline of a moral hazard problem that derives this
result formally, due to Levin and Tadelis (2007). However, the assumption that w < w can also
be motivated informally by appealing to the prot motive. In this case, the high powered incentive
prinarily a¤ects the owner of the rm rather than lower level employees.
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term on the right hand side of equation (4), d(g; r); represents the contracting cost
curve. Conceptually, contracting costs include the costs of all aspects of contracting.
Therefore, while the model assumes that w < w; it can be true that  >  for
some given service level g if d() is substantially higher than s. Contracting costs rise
with the service level, g. For example, a higher g could be more costly to contract
over simply because writing more detailed contracts requires more paper.10 The
other argument in the contracting cost curve is r, a general catch-all for how di¢ cult
it is to contract in the city. It includes potentially a wide variety of characteristics
of the environment.11
Throughout, this paper assumes that @d
@g
> 0; because specifying and monitoring
a higher level is more costly and that @d
@r
> 0; because r by denition describes the
di¢ culty of contracting. However two other assumptions are less strict: d(0; r) 2 R
and @d
2
@g@g
2 R. The rst of these assumptions captures the notion that there could
be xed costs to contracting,12 and the second assumption reects the fact that there
could be either economies of scale or diseconomies of scale to contracting.13
Solving equations (3) and (4) for  and  respectively, and substituting them
back into equation (2), each in turn, yields the two utility functions given below.
U j(g; j; yj; y; s; w) = (1  w
g + s
y
)yj + j ln(g) (5)
U j(g; j; yj; y; r; w) = (1  w
g + d(g; r)
y
)yj + j ln(g) (6)
10There are many reasons even drawing up contracts could be more costly for higher service
levels, where service level includes both quality and quantity aspects. For example in the context
of ambulances, it may be easier to monitor ambulance response times than to develop clever ways
to ensure paramedics are always delivering the correct lifesaving techniques inside the ambulance.
Both higher response times and better techniques represent higher quality, and to achieve either
may require more quantity.
11A monopolistically competitive rms higher price enters the cost of production through r. It
may be more conventional to think of a city with few suppliers as a¤ecting the wage w. However,
one can also interpret this as a haggling cost and thus a transaction cost incurred by the city.
12Fixed costs to contracting could include learning about the contracting process, search costs
incurred while locating a lawyer, and potentially costs that are more political in nature, such as
dealing with striking employees. The appendix presents the outline of an extension to the model
where externalities exist across services, and outsourcing one service will a¤ect the cost of providing
other services, thus representing a xed cost.
13Bajari and Tadelis (2001) develop a model with constant returns to scale to contracting. Con-
tracting over quality is interpreted as contracting over contingencies. If each contingency is equally
costly to cover, then people rst contract over the contingencies that are most likely to occur, and so
contracting costs will be convex in quality. However, changing one of the assumptions of Bajari and
Tadelis (2001), if there are su¢ cient economies of scale to contracting over contingencies, a concave
contracting cost curve d(g; r) can result, even when some contingencies have a low probability of
occurring. Thus, it is not clear a priori whether there are constant returns to scale (or decreasing
returns to scale) to contracting, which implies d(g; r) is convex, or if there are increasing returns to
scale, implying d(g; r).is concave.
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2.2 Political Competition and Platform Determination
While equations (5) and (6) represent the votersbasic preferences under each public
service provision mode, voters are assumed not to vote deterministically, at least from
the perspective of the candidates (and the econometrician). Another dimension,
unrelated to policy, also a¤ects voter utility and is represented here by two uniformly
distributed random variables.14 The rst random variable is ij and this is specic to
each individual, but is drawn from a distribution that is common to that individuals
group j so that in addition to yj and j, groups also share the same distribution
of their ij. The second random variable  which is common to each citizen in the
population. There are two political candidates, k = A;B and the random variables
represent a citizens non-policy based bias towards (or if negative, against) candidate
B. The timing is as follows: candidates become aware of citizen characteristics
(yj; j), given parameters (wx; r; d(0; r); s) and the distributions of ij and . Next,
candidates announce platforms, (gxA; g
x
B). Then uncertainty is resolved (
ij and  are
determined), elections are held, and the winning candidate implements his platform.
In the election stage, citizen i in group j votes for candidate A only if
U j(gA)  U j(gB) + ij +  (7)
ij is distributed uniformly over the support [  1
2j
; 1
2j
] where j is specic to group
j, and  is distributed uniformly over the support [ 1
2 
; 1
2 
]: j will be interpreted as
a group j voters "voting power". j > 0 is assumed, and a high j means ij is
distributed over a short interval; in this case, voters base their vote less heavily on
things unrelated to policy.
Given the platforms of both candidates, the vote share for candidate A is given
by
A =
X
j
jj(j +
1
2j
) (8)
where j is dened as j = U j(gA)   U j(gB)   . Dening j in this way
simplies solving the model mathematically but it also has an interpretation. A
voter with ij = j can be thought of as the "swing voter" in group j the voter who
is indi¤erent from voting for candidate A or B. Everyone in group j with a value of
ij less than j votes for candidate A: To see that equation (8) is candidate As vote
share, note that because ij is distributed over
h
 1
2j
; 1
2j
i
, the term j(j + 1
2j
) is
always between zero and one, and this represents the percent of group j voters that
14This section of the model borrows from Persson and Tabellini (2000). As they discuss, the
assumption of a uniform distribution is not crucial for the results to go through.
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vote for candidate A.15 Candidate As expected vote share is
EA =
1
2
+
X
j
jj[U
j(gA)  U j(gB)] (9)
As candidates are assumed to be o¢ ce-seeking, they announce platforms to max-
imize their expected vote share. Candidates are also assumed to have equal access
to utilize either mode. To illustrate how candidates determine platforms in equilib-
rium, consider the problem facing Candidate A: If he uses the "make" production
technology, the platform (gA) that maximizes his probability of winning solves
@EA
@g
=
YX
j=O
jj
@U j(gA)
@gA
= 0 (10)
Given the functional form assumption on U(), equation (10) yields a unique
solution for gA; denoted g

A . If instead candidate A uses the "buy" production
technology, an equation analogous to (10) shows how the optimal gA is determined.
(Equation (10) uses the utility curve from equation (5), so the analogous equation
would simply use the utility function from equation (6) instead.) Candidate B also
performs analogous maximization problems for each mode; it will be the case that
gB = g

A and g

B = g

A because EB is simply 1  EA:
Each candidate k 2 fA;Bg must decide which platform, gk or gk to announce,
taking into account the action of the other candidate. In equilibrium, each candidate
selects the platform that gives the highest probability of winning given the platform
selected by the other candidate.
Proposition 1: There is a unique Nash equilibrium to the two-party probabilistic
voting game with multiple production functions where each candidate announces
the same platform. Moreover, the equilibrium platform g that is chosen by both
candidates is given by g whenever
P
j jjU
j(g) Pj jjU j(g) and is given
by g whenever
P
j jjU
j(g) <
P
j jjU
j(g):
Proof: Given candidates are optimizing, one can focus attention onto only four
states of the world in the election stage: (gA ; g

B ) , (g

A ; g

B ) , (g

A ; g

B ) or (g

A ; g

B ):
However if each candidate is o¤ering a di¤erent platform, it implies one candidate
has a probability of winning that is greater than :5 and the other a probability of
winning that is less than :5; thus one candidate could change platforms and strictly
increase his chance of winning,16 which eliminates both (gA ; g

B ) and (g

A ; g

B ) as
possible equilibria. Finally, only one of either (gA ; g

B ) or (g

A ; g

B ) will be an
15The distribution on  is assumed to not be too wide in order to rule out a corner solution. For
simplicity,  = minfY ; Og:
16This is true unless the optimized in-house and privatized platforms coincide: However continuity
ensures that this is a measure zero event.
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equilibrium, as one is inferior in the sense that, in the inferior case, either candidate
could unilaterally change his platform to the optimal level with the other mode, which
would yield a higher value to his expected vote share, equation (9), and thus strictly
increase his chances of winning. Q.E.D.
This proof generalizes results from the probabilistic voting literature to account
for multiple production functions; here, the production functions are taken from the
transaction cost economics literature. While the proof rests on the concept of Nash
equilibrium, it is straightforward to extend it to the concept of subgame perfection
if platform announcements are sequential. In this setup, the random variable 
essentially decides the election. However more importantly, the parameters of the
model - j; j; j; yj; wx; and r - decide policy.
2.3 Comparative Statics
This subsection explores how changes in the variables of the model e¤ect likelihood
of outsourcing. Of particular interest is how changes in the size of the elderly voter
group a¤ects the likelihood of outsourcing. To answer this question, one must rst
understand how changes in the size of the elderly voter group a¤ects service level.
Through equation (10) and equation (5), one can see that g solves the following for
g (derivation in appendix):
gw =
y(OOO + Y Y Y )
(OOyO + Y Y yY )
(11)
where y = Y yY + OyO: Note that dividing both sides by w yields a closed
form solution for g, and it is then straightforward to take a partial derivative.
The solution using the buy production technology, found by inserting (6) into (10),
however, does not have a closed form. Nonetheless, one can characterize g as
solving the following for g:
gw + gdg(g; r) =
y(OOO + Y Y Y )
(OOyO + Y Y yY )
(12)
This is an equation whose right-hand side is identical to the right-hand side of the
previous equation. Denote the expression on the right-hand sides of (11) and (12)
by 
: Although one cannot derive a closed form solution for @g

@O
without imposing
functional form assumption on d(g; r); one can still characterize the direction of the
comparative static, if not its precise magnitude. If @

@O
> 0 then both
@g
@O
> 0
and
@g
@O
> 0 because the left hand sides of both (11) and (12) are monotonically
increasing in g, so that if the right-hand side (
) increases, g must increase in the
left-hand side of both equations to preserve the equality. Therefore, by studying 
,
one can gain a sense of the directional e¤ect of a demographic shift on equilibrium
service level g.
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Demographic shifts a¤ect service level through three channels: an tax base e¤ect, a
preference-power e¤ect, and a tax-payer-power e¤ect. First, the tax base e¤ect causes
y in the numerator of 
 to change; an increase in average tax base will contribute to
a service level increase. If the portion of elderly increases, then average tax base will
increase if yO > yY and will decrease if the reverse holds.17 Second, the preference-
power e¤ect comes through the second term in the numerator of 
, (OOO +
Y Y Y ). If the portion of elderly increases, the preference-power e¤ect will be
positive, and will contribute towards an increase in service level if OO > Y Y ,
that is, if the elderlys preference for the publicly provided good, weighted by their
voting power, is stronger than the preference of the young, weighted by their own
voting power.18 Finally, the tax-payer-power e¤ect inuences service level though
the term (OOyO +Y Y yY ); the denominator of 
: If the portion of elderly voters
increases, the tax-payer-power e¤ect serves to decrease service level if OyO > Y yY
(and will increase service level if the reverse holds.) This reducing e¤ect comes about
as, although voters may enjoy consuming the publicly provided good, they are averse
to paying for it. In sum, one must take into account the combined inuence of
all three forces when analyzing how a demographic change a¤ects changes in service
level. If O > Y ; O > Y and yO > yY ; as seems plausible given the balance of
the extant data and literature, it can be shown that the positive preference-power
and tax base e¤ects outweigh the negative tax-payer-power e¤ect, so that service
level increases when the portion of elderly voters increases. However, even if one of
these conditions does not hold, for example if yO < yY ; the derivative can still in fact
be positive, as long the tax base of the old is not "too much" less than that of the
young. The cuto¤ point, when yo is much less than yy, occurs when the negative
tax base e¤ect from the increasing size of a poor, elderly populaiton, overtakes the
postive payer-power e¤ect. All of the above claims are shown in more detail in the
appendix.
The table below summarizes how some of the variables of the model a¤ect service
level, and the conditions under which the stated comparative static direction holds.
17That the income of the elderly is larger than that of the young (i.e. yO > yY ) seems to be an
unreasonable assumption for most cities. However, it is quite plausible if housing value is the tax
base. In Census data for the 200 largest U.S. cities in 2000, the ratio of average housing value for
householders older than 65 to average housing value for householders between the ages of 15-64 was
1.3. Only 25 cities had a ratio less than one, and only four cities had a ratio less than :8.
18As discussed in the introduction, O > Y is likely to hold. As for the relationship between O
and Y ; Campbell (2003) explains that the elderly are more likely to have their policy preferences
realized than other groups, partly as a result of their high rate of voting participation. Indeed, a
recent survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (2006) shows that a person of age over 65 is
nearly twice as likely as the average 18-29 year old to be a regular voter, and is nearly three times as
likely to be registered to vote. If this research implies that O > Y , for example, if voter turnout
is correlated with voting power, then this condition is more likely to hold. The interpretation of j
as a measure of abstention makes sense in the reduced form version of the model, as candidate A
maximizes his expected vote share, EA = 12 +
P
jj [U
j(gA)   U j(gB)]. In this case,  can be
thought of as a measure of the fraction of eligible voters, , that actually vote.
10
As mentioned in the above paragraph, the condition for @g

@O
> 0 is overly restrictive;
it is su¢ cient but not necessary for this comparative static direction to hold.
Table 1 E¤ect of Variable Change on Equilibrium Service Level
Direction of
Comparative Static Condition
@g
@O
> 0 O > Y ; O > Y and yO > yY
@g
@O
> 0 O 6= 0
@g
@Y
> 0 Y 6= 0
@g
@yO
< 0 O > Y
@g
@yY
> 0 O > Y
@g
@O
> 0 
O
yO
> 
Y
yY
@g
@Y
< 0 
O
yO
> 
Y
yY
As service level g varies with some parameters of the model, the change in service
level a¤ects the likelihood of outsourcing. First, consider how an exogenous change
in service level g a¤ects likelihood of outsourcing. Then, working backwards, it is
possible to say how the variables of the model a¤ect likelihood of outsourcing as table
1 shows how the variables of the model a¤ect service level g. Consider gure 1a,
which plots four separate cases of both balanced budget constraints (equations 3 and
4) on the same graph. The shape of the "buy" balanced budget constraint depends
on two parameters of the contracting cost curve; as described in section 2.1, two
assumptions on contracting costs are exible: d(0; r) 2 R and @d2
@g@g
2 R. Exploring
the model at di¤erent points in these two dimensions of parameter space yields four
scenarios, one for each pair of contracting cost curve assumptions, with the tax-base
y on the y-axis and service level g on the x-axis.
As long as xed costs to contracting are not too high in the convex case, and setup
costs are not too high in the concave case, there could be only one or two points of
intersection of these two curves.19 The lower envelope is associated with the least
cost mode for any given level g and these points of intersection can be thought of
19This holds as long as @d
2
@g@g 6= 0:
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as "kink" points on the lower envelope. If something causes the level of service to
move nearer to a kink point, it can be interpreted as increasing probability of regime
change, and if the kink point marks a regime change from g to g, one can say
the likelihood of outsourcing increases. On the other hand, if the kink point marks
a regime change from g to g, one can say the likelihood of outsourcing decreases
as the level becomes nearer to the kink point. The number of kink points, and
whether they mark a regime change from g to g or vice versa, is a function of the
two dimensions of contracting costs. The prediction for how an increase in service
a¤ects likelihood of outsourcing (denoted by L) for each set of contracting curve is
illustrated in gure 1b.
Proposition 2: Depending on the values of d(0; r) and @
2d
@g@g
, the likelihood of
outsourcing is either increasing, decreasing, U-shaped, or inverted U-shaped with
respect to service level, is one (always buy) or zero (always make.) With high
xed costs and concave contracting cost curve (CCC), the likelihood of outsourcing is
increasing as service level increases; with low xed costs and a convex CCC, likelihood
of outsourcing is decreasing as service level increases; with low xed costs and concave
CCC, likelihood of outsourcing is U-shaped as service level increases; and with high
xed costs and a convex CCC, likelihood of outsourcing is inverted U-shaped as
service level increases. If setup costs are very high in the concave case, outsourcing
will always occur, and if xed contracting costs are very high in the convex case,
outsourcing will never occur.
Proof: Interpreting service levels moving closer to kink points as higher likelihoods
of regime change establishes the claims in proposition 2.
For example, consider the case of an increase in g; perhaps brought about by an
increase in O (or O when the necessary conditions are met). This will cause the
likelihood of outsourcing to decrease in the case of a convex contracting cost curve
without xed costs, increase in the case of a concave contracting cost curve (CCC)
with xed costs, decrease at rst and then increase (U-shaped) in the concave CCC
without xed costs case, and decrease at rst and then increase (inverted U-shaped)
in the convex CCC with xed costs case. Thus, the model outlined in the previous
subsections generates four hypotheses for how changes in service level a¤ect likelihood
of outsourcing. Without a strong theoretical prior on the shape of the CCC, only
empirical analysis can shed light on which hypothesis may be valid. This empirical
problem is the topic of the next section, and the empirical results will be used to
reject some of the hypotheses.
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Figure 1a Tax Price and Service Level
Figure 1b Likelihood of Outsourcing and Service Level
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A few comparative statics remain to establish. Until now this subsection has
only described the comparative static properties of the model for changes in the
demographic and political economy variables ; ; y and  and has said nothing about
the industrial organization variables r; w; d(0; r) and s. The e¤ect of a change in these
variables on likelihood of outsourcing is much more straightforward, as their e¤ects
do not depend on service level and the shape of the contracting cost curve. Consider
how these variables a¤ect the lower envelope of the two balanced budget equations
in gure 1. If the xed costs to contracting d(0; r) increase, then the likelihood
that a random service level will be produced with buy technology decreases; thus the
likelihood of outsourcing decreases. The same hold true for the contracting di¢ culty
r and the wage for private contractor w. Conversely, if the setup costs to in-house
provision increase, then the likelihood that any service level will produced with make
technology decreases, and the likelihood of outsourcing increases, and the same holds
true for the wage for in-house producer w:
Table 2 E¤ect of Variable Change on Outsourcing Likelihood
An increase in ...causes likelihood
this variable... of outsourcing to:
under
@d2
@g@g
 0 @d2
@g@g
< 0  assumptions
#
decrease decrease, d(0; r) < s
then increase
g
increase, increase d(0; r)  s
then decrease
r decrease
w increase
w decrease
d(0; r) decrease
s increase
When interpreting the model it is crucial to distinguish between those variables
that a¤ect likelihood of outsourcing directly (e.g. those listed in the bottom half of
table 2), versus those that a¤ect likelihood of outsourcing though service level (e.g.
g, and those in table 1). The e¤ect of an increase in service level on likelihood of
outsourcing depends on the two assumptions on the contracting cost curve, and will
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therefore be determined empirically. The most important comparative static for this
purpose is on O. If the percent of the voting age population over 65 increases then
service level will increase, but it is unclear if this increase in service level will cause
likelihood of outsourcing to increase, decrease, or be U-shaped or inverted U-shaped.
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
The goal of the empirical section is straightforward  to see how the percent of
elderly voters in a city is correlated with ambulance outsourcing. The empirical
model used here is a Probit, and mode of emergency ambulance transport provision
is the dependent variable, with buy equal to one and make equal to zero.20 The
theoretical model of the previous section generates four competing hypotheses for
how the percent elderly correlates with outsourcing, depending on the shape of the
contracting cost curve. The empirical results presented in this section will be used
to distinguish between them, and thus to identify the shape of the contracting cost
curve. In particular, this section will investigate whether the relationship between
percent elderly and outsourcing is either monotonically increasing or decreasing, U-
shaped, inverted U-shaped, or other. Any correlation consistent with one of the rst
four relationships is consistent with one specic version of the model, while any other
correlation (or lack of a correlation) is not consistent with the model. The correlation
between a number of the other variables is also of interest, and several of them can
be used to judge the validity of the model. .
As a digression, perhaps a more direct test than the one proposed above would
be to see how variation in quality level correlates with outsourcing. Unfortunately,
direct empirical measures for quality level of the service are di¢ cult to obtain for a
number of reasons. First, public service quality is inherently hard to measure (Tirole,
1994). Also, even when it would have been possible to gather a decent measure of
quality, no entity to date could be found that has made available such data.21 This
lack of data on quality explains the approach taken here; it is not possible to see
how quality correlates with outsourcing, but it is possible to say what a¤ects quality,
though the model developed in the previous section.
Alternatively one may prefer to see if expenditure data correlates with outsourc-
ing. Here too, good data for ambulance expenditures are di¢ cult to obtain, because
they are often combined with data on rst responders under the heading emergency
medical service (EMS)22 and because this type of data is often lumped together with
20The data appendix contains the details of how the data was recoded into either make or buy.
21The lack of data on EMS performance, and its e¤ect, was lamented in a series of articles
published by Robert Davis in USA Today beginning on 7/28/2006.
22There are many components to what is commonly known as EMS. Many surveys ask about
emergency medical service as if it were one service. In fact, there are two main components:
rst responder service, and transport service. A rst responder is the rst unit dispatched to
the emergency scene, usually by a central 911 center. In the majority of cases, the city owned
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expenditures for re departments. Also, there is no guarantee that high expenditures
necessarily leads to high quality.
Data for the dependent variable come from the Journal of Emergency Medical
Service (JEMS) for the years 1990 and 2000 (published in 1991 and 2001, respectively)
and these provide the basis for two separate data sets. JEMS is a trade publication
that produces an annual survey of emergency medical services, both rst-responder
and transport providers, in the 200 largest U.S. cities. This data is highly detailed,
including the type, name and address of all emergency ambulance providers in a
community.23 The independent variables come from a number of di¤erent sources.
The following tables summarize all the variables used in this study, their relationship
to the theoretical model, and summary statistics.
Several of the independent variables used here are from the 1990 and 2000 Decen-
nial Census (summary le 3). The fraction of the voting age population over 65 (a
proxy for O) is the variable that is of primary interest in this study, as ambulances
are a service for which the elderly are a particularly important group.24 The value
of the square of this term is also critical, to distinguish between the four main hy-
potheses of the theoretical model; thus there are no expected signs for population >
65 nor its square. Also from the Census, the value of owner-occupied housing units
without a mortgage over number of households over 65 (approximate value of houses
owned by elderly) divided by value of owner-occupied housing units with a mortgage
over number of households between 18 and 65 (approximate value of houses owned
by young) creates the variable (yO=yY ). If the elderly have a larger tax base than
the young, then the elderly will be paying for a larger portion of the public service,
and this will serve to reduce the service level. Therefore while cities with a large
portion of the population over 65 should have a high service level, the theoretical
model suggests the relative tax base variable is also important.
re department has responsibility for rst responding, and it is not uncommon for a re truck to
be dispatched for this purpose. After stabilizing the situation, a transport vehicle (ambulance)
typically arrives to take the patient to a hospital if further care is required. It may be the case
that the ambulance is both the rst responder and transport provider, but it is never the case that
the re truck is both, as re trucks lack the capability of carrying patients in a horizontal position.
Other data sets that have been used in previous literature, for example, those collected by the
International City Managers Association (ICMA) and U.S. Census Bureaus Census of Government
(Organizational Phase) do not di¤erentiate between these two distinct components of EMS.
23Private ambulances exist in almost all communities, however these ambulances do not always
provide emergency transport service, the focus of this study. Many of these provide hospital-to-
hospital, home-to-hospital, or other types of transport, but not emergency transport of the sort that
is paid for by the local government.
24Although the theoretical model suggests the fraction of the voting age population that is elderly
is the appropriate measure to use here, it is possible that the absolute number of elderly voters
a¤ects the outsourcing decision in a di¤erent way, for example, by representing a "critical mass" to
form an interest group. Although the results when the absolute number of elderly are used are not
reported here, they do not di¤er substantially than when the fraction of elderly is used. However
when both the fraction and number are included simutanously, insignicant results obtain, likely do
to colinearity between the two measures.
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Table 3 Variables and their Theoretical Counterparts
Variable Description Model
Proxy
mode Mode of ambulance provision; "make"=0, "buy"=1 x
log(pop) Logarithm of the citys population s; d(0; r)
log(house_value) Logarithm of the average housing value in the city y; r
population > 65 Fraction of voting age population above 65 years of age O
population > 65sq the square of population > 65 O
hvalue65/hvalue18 total housing value of residents over 65 years of age, over yO=yY
the total housing value of residents between 18 and 65
years of age
union fraction of all city government employees in unions d(0; r)
re_union fraction of city re department employees in unions d(0; r)
relative_wage Average wage of city employees over average wage of w=w
private sector employees in the county in which the city is
located
re_wage Average wage of re employees over wage of private sector w=w
employees in county in which city is located
no strike Dummy indicating state law prohibits city employees from r
striking
unemployment Unemployment rate in county in which city is located r
ideology Percent of votes for Bush in county in which city is r
located
no pol activity Dummy indicating state law prohibits political activity by r
city employee
merit Dummy indicating state law requires cities use a merit r
system in hiring
standards Dummy indicating state law sets city purchasing standards r
debt limit Dummy indicating debt limits imposed on cities, r
borrowing Dummy indicating state law permits short-term borrowing r
by cities
take over Dummy indicating state law authorizes state "take over" of r
city nances
balanced budget Dummy indicating state law mandates city have a balanced r
budget
state assess Dummy indicating property tax assessment is a state r
function
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Table 4 Summary Statistics
1990 2000
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs
mode .65 .47 0 1 200 .57 .50 0 1 200
log(pop) 12.24 .75 10.33 15.81 200 12.37 .72 11.49 15.90 200
log(house_value) 10.66 .54 9.23 12.26 200 11.09 .52 9.42 12.44 200
population > 65 .16 .04 .05 .35 200 .15 .04 .07 .22 200
population > 65sq .03 .02 .003 .12 200 .02 .01 .005 .05 200
hvalue65/hvalue18 1.61 .55 .43 4.40 200 1.47 .47 .33 3.51 200
union .43 .34 0 1 199
re_union .60 .52 0 2.98 192
relative_wage 1.13 .20 .63 1.78 199 1.15 .24 .60 1.97 200
re_wage 1.36 .33 .14 2.48 192 1.41 .39 .46 3.06 183
unemployment 5.38 1.85 2 12.9 200 3.97 1.22 1.6 10.4 200
ideology .52 .10 .22 .78 197 .45 .12 .09 .82 200
no pol activity .50 .50 0 1 199
no strike .04 .18 0 1 199
merit .45 .50 0 1 199
standards .78 .41 0 1 199
debt limit .86 .34 0 1 199
borrowing .10 .30 0 1 199
take over .12 .33 0 1 199
balanced budget .08 .26 0 1 199
state assess .19 .39 0 1 199
Two other variables from the the Decennial Census are population and average
housing value, calculated as total housing value over number of households, and are
both important control variables. While the model predicts level will not depend
on y (due to the quasi-linear nature of the utility function) it is still an important
control variable, as it may have a tax base e¤ect, or an inuence on r if contractors
are attracted to richer areas, making it easier for cities to contract. Population may
be related to both s and d(0; r). For example, large cities may experience economies
of scale or scope in in-house production, and so may lower s. Larger cities may
also have experience with contracting, lowering d(), but on the other hand, may face
larger political xed costs to contracting, for example, if there is a wage externality,
as discussed in footnote 23, they have more employees a¤ected. Therefore neither
log of population nor log of average housing value has a prior expected sign.
Two variables relate to the unionization of city workers, and come from the U.S.
Census Bureaus 1987 Census of Government (Employment Phase). The percent
of all city workers in a union, and the percent of reghters in unions may capture
the value of d(0; r): If there is high unionization of reghters, for example, then
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it could be hard to privatize the service. If the city makes the service itself, it will
usually do so through the re department, and so re departments may take actions to
prevent losing responsibility for providing emergency ambulance service. Therefore
the expected sign on both of the unionization variables is negative. Unionization
data was not available in latter years, and is therefore only included in the 1990
regressions.
Another variable relates to the wage rates and is a measure for w=w. It comes
from two sources: the public wage comes from the 1987 and 1997 Census of Gov-
ernment (Employment Phase), and the private wage from 1987 and 1997 County
Business Patterns. The public wage is calculated as the total payroll divided by the
number of workers, and the private wage is the average wage of private workers in the
county in which the city is located, calculated in the same way.25 The model yields
a clear prediction: w=w should be negatively related to outsourcing according to
the model.
Two additional variables, also used in previous studies, are unemployment in
1990 and 2000 (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics), and a measure of ideology.
Unemployment a¤ects labor market conditions, and Lopez et al. (1997) argue that
politicians will have an incentive to keep services in-house to avoid political costs
when unemployment is high. Thus, the expected relationship between unemploy-
ment and outsourcing is negative. As for ideology, more Republican leaning areas
are expected to be associated with more outsourcing, as Republicans traditionally
favor a smaller scope of government, compared to Democrats. Thus the expected
relationship between ideology and outsourcing is positive. 1988 data on the percent
of votes cast for the Republican presidential candidate (George H.W. Bush) in the
county in which the city is located serves to proxy for ideology in the 1990 sample,
and these data come from ICPSR. Similarly, the percent of votes for the Republican
presidential candidate (George W. Bush) in the county in which the city is located
serve to proxy for ideology in the 2000 presidential election for the 2000 data set;
these are taken from http://cnn.com/elections. A standard theoretical interpreta-
tion for how ideology a¤ects outsourcing involves recourse to a primitive preference
for outsourcing. This notion is heuristic and does not make for very interesting
theory, however plausible it may be.
Finally, the regressions also include a number of dummy variables. One is re-
lated to cost of employment. U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental
Relations(USACIR) presents data on state laws that impact various aspects of city
governance. Data from USACIR (1993), variable no strike, is a dummy variable that
indicates a state-law prohibits city employees from striking. Lopez-de-Salinas etl
al (1997) argue that...In terms of the model here, this interpretation would serve to
reduce w: However no strike may also inuence d(0; r) thus its e¤ect on likelihood
25Sometimes city borders cross county borders and a city will be located in more than one county.
In this case, Google searches determined which county the city was primarily located in and the
average private wage from this county was used.
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of privatization is ambiguous.
Other dummy variable serve to proxy for r, the catch-all variable in the model.
USACIR variables include a number of "clean government variables" including: no
pol activity (f15) indicating state law prohibits political activity by city or county
employees, merit (f1) indicating state law requires cities to adopt a merit system, and
standards (e14) indicating state law sets purchasing standards for local governments.
All of these should be positively correlated with outsourcing, because "...the more
di¢ cult it is to pursue political ends through in-house provision of public services, the
more likely local politicians are to privatize these services." (Lopez et al. 1997, p453).
There are also a number of budget constraint variables: debt limit (e1) indicating debt
limits are imposed by states on cities, borrowing (e7) indicating state law forbids
short-term borrowing by local units, take over (e19) indicating state law authorizes
state "take over" of the nancial administration of the city, balanced budget (e24)
indicating state constitution or statutory law mandates a balanced budget, and state
assess (e23) indicating property tax assessment is a state function. All of these
should be positively correlated with outsourcing, as "...the harder budget constraints
politicians face, the more likely they should be to privatize government." (Lopez et
al. 1997, p. 454).
The results of the Probit regressions using the 1990 data are reported below in
table 3. None of the USACIR variables are included in this table, but including them
did not alter the sign or magnitude of any of the other variables substantially. The
signs and signicance of these dummy variables are discussed next, along with the
other results.
Rather than reporting the estimated Probit coe¢ cients, which are di¢ cult to
interpret, the table above reports the marginal e¤ect, that is, the change in the
probability for an innitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and
reports the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
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Table 5 Largest 200 U.S. cities, 1990
Dependent variable: mode (buy = 1), marginal e¤ects reported, standard errors in ( )
pop65 .10 3.72 .83 8.31 11.03 11.97 12.14
(.77) (3.26) (.84) (3.57) (3.65) (3.75) (3.71)
pop65sq -10.62 -21.71 -28.72 -30.70 -33.46
(9.36) (10.17) (10.26) (10.49) (10.54)
log(pop) -.17 -.18 -.17 -.18 -.18
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
log(house_value) .24 .26 .17 .16 .05
(.08) (.08) (.09) (.09) (.10)
relative_wage_re .34
(.14)
re_union -.06
(.07)
relative_wage .46 .42
(.22) (.21)
union .06
(.12)
ideology .99 .87 .80
(.38) (.38) (.38)
unemployment -.02 -.02 -.008
(.02) (.02) (.02)
yo/yy -.23
(.10)
Pseudo R2 .00 .01 .10 .12 .18 .16 .20
LL -130 -129 -117 -114 -104 -103 -101
***, ** and * denote signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, with
appropriate test statistics
The estimated coe¢ cient on population > 65 is positive across all specications.
In the fourth specication, the coe¢ cient is signicant at the 5% level, and is signi-
cant at the 1% level in all subsequent specications. The estimated coe¢ cient on the
square of population > 65 is negative in all specications, is signicant at the 5% level
in the fourth specication and at the 1% level in all subsequent specications. The
increasing signicance of these estimates is primarily due to the increase in magnitude
of the marginal e¤ects in the later specications, with the standard errors remaining
about the same. Together, the positive marginal e¤ect on population > 65 and
negative marginal e¤ect on population > 65sq indicate the percent of the voting age
population over the age of 65 has an inverted U-shape correlation with probability of
outsourcing. The top of the inverted U is calculated to occur when population > 65
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is between 18 and 20%. In the data, 62 cities have a population > 65 that is larger
than 18%, and 22 cities have a population > 65 that is greater than 20%.
The results for population are negative and signicant at the 1% level, with consis-
tent marginal e¤ect estimates and standard errors across all specications. Although
no prior sign was expected, this nding suggests that larger populations may be more
strongly associated with smaller setup costs than thickness, or competitiveness, of
the contractor market. The results for average housing value are positive across all
specications, but the marginal e¤ects fall in magnitude in the later specications,
so much so that in the last specication this variable is no longer signicant at the
10% level. It is possible that correlation between this variable and other variables,
especially yo/yy, means its e¤ect on outsourcing is diluted in the larger specications.
The theoretical model did not shed light on the expected sign; the positive correlation
is consistent with contractors being more likely to operate in areas of high housing
value, although it is unclear how average housing value also a¤ects service level.
The coe¢ cient on public-private wage ratio is positive, and this is the sign sug-
gested by the model. The estimates are signicant at the 5% level, and are of about
the same magnitude in both specications in which they appear. When the average
wage of reghters is used as the public wage, similar results obtain, namely, the
marginal e¤ect is positive (although of slightly smaller magnitude) and signicant at
the 5% level. The coe¢ cient on ideology (proxied by percent Republican) is also of
the expected sign (positive). The marginal e¤ect varies in magnitude from .8 to 1,
and varies in signicance from the 1% level to the 5% level.
Neither of the unionization variables, the percent of all city workers in unions or
percent of reghters in unions, is signicant. Also, the coe¢ cient on unemployment
is not signicant at the 10% level in any specication. The relative housing value
variable is signicant at the 5% level and of negative sign.
Finally, although the USACIR dummy variables are not reported in the above
specications, they were included in other specications and are reported in the
appendix. borrowing, which indicated that state law forbids short-term borrowing
by cities, was signicant at the 1% level, both when included with the rest of the other
state law variables and when included separately. It was positive (marginal e¤ect
equals .25) which is in-line with the theory presented in Lopez-de-Silanes et al (1997).
state assess, which indicated state property tax assessment is a state function, was
also positive (marginal e¤ect equals .16), consistent with theory, and this is signicant
at the 5% level in both specications. No other variable was signicant at the 5%
level in either specication, nor at least the 10% in both specications. Overall, the
analysis indicates that for state laws, emergency ambulance service outsourcing is
more responsive to budget constraint variables than to "clean government" variables,
but not all budget constraint variables are important.
The same specications in table 3 are repeated with 2000 data, and the results are
reported below in table 4. However as indicated above, not all of the same data was
available, in particular those related to unionization, and the USACIR variables.
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Table 6 Largest 200 U.S. cities, 2000
Dependent variable: mode (buy = 1), marginal e¤ects reported, standard errors in ( )
pop65 -.06 6.15 .10 14.87 17.33 23.01 16.73
(1.01) (6.85) (1.06) (7.35) (7.50) (8.40) (7.68)
pop65sq -21.47 -50.80 -58.39 -75.69 -58.42
(23.44) (25.02) (25.51) (28.29) (26.08)
log(pop) -.23 -.26 -.24 -.23 -.24
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
log(house_value) .06 .08 .04 -.02 -.06
(.07) (.07) (.08) (.08) (.09)
relative_wage_re .27
(.13)
relative_wage .27 .13
(.18) (.20)
ideology .005 .004 .006
(.003) (.003) (.003)
unemployment -.02 -.06 -.02
(.03) (.04) (.03)
yo/yy -.22
(.11)
Pseudo R2 .00 .003 .07 .09 .11 .11 .12
LL -136 -136 -127 -125 -122 -112 -120
***, ** and * denote signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, with
appropriate test statistics
The results of analysis of the 2000 data largely conrm the ndings of the 1990
with respect to population > 65 and population > 65 squared. The coe¢ cient on
population> 65 is positive and varies in signicant from 5% in the fourth specication
to 1% in larger specications. Similarly, the coe¢ cient on population > 65 squared
is negative (as in 1990) and varies in signicance from 5% to 1% in fourth column
and later specications, respectively. In this case, the top of the inverted U occurs
between 14-16%, somewhat earlier than in 1990. In the 2000 data, 115 cities have
population > 65 that is larger than 14%, and 61 cities have population > 65 larger
than 16%.
The marginal e¤ect and signicance of log population is very similar to 1990 in
that it is positive and signicant at the 1% level in all specications. The coe¢ cient
on yo/yy remains negative and is still signicant at the 5% level, as in 1990. However
there are a number of di¤erences to report with the rest of the variables. Log of
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average housing value is not signicant at the 10% level in any specication. Also, the
coe¢ cient on wage ratio, while still positive in all regressions, is no longer signicant
at the 10% level when the average wage of all public employees is used as the public
wage. However when the average wage of reghters is used as the public wage, the
coe¢ cient remains positive at the 5% level. This shows that taking into account the
specic details of the institutional setting for ambulances is important.
Unemployment remains insignicant as in 1990. However ideology, while still
positive, is not signicant in 2000, except for being marginally signicant in the
nal specication. However, the marginal e¤ect is of substantially lower magnitude.
There are several possible explanations for why these variables do not do as well of a
job explaining ambulance outsourcing in the 2000 regression.
Although only conjecture, perhaps the most compelling reason is that urban
sprawl has intensied over the decade, and so the variables that rely on county-
level measures do not do as well of a job of measuring the city characteristics they
are meant to proxy. These county-level variables include percent Republican, private
sector wage and unemployment.
Another possible reason has to do with the unobserved changes in the EMS in-
dustry. EMS is a much more recent service to be provided by local governments; a
telling statistic is that even in 2000, several states indicated they had at least one
funeral home providing EMS transport service (EMS Magazine, 2001); while this
seems strange today, having hearses provide medical transport was a fairly common
practice even as recently as a few decades ago (Poole, 1980). Given the potential
changes over time, it is important to know whether data from both years should be
pooled. The Chow-type test for Probit models (Greene, 2000) rejects the hypothesis
that the coe¢ cient vectors are the same in both periods at the 95% condence level.
A nal result may shed light on a di¤erent but related question; that is if, and how,
cities with di¤erent forms of government respond to political incentives. The large
majority of cities are of two main forms: council-manager or mayor-council. The
rst is analogous to a parliamentary form of government in that the elected council
hires a manager to run the city, while the second is analogous to a presidential system
of government in that the voters elect not only the council, but also the leader (the
mayor).
Levin and Tadelis (2007, p. 12) conjecture, "...elected mayors may have motiva-
tions that are more explicitly political than appointed managers." They nd that
managers are somewhat more likely to outsource services, and this is true here as
well.26 This notion can be captured through the theoretical model presented in this
paper. If it is true that city managers do not care about politics, then it is reasonable
to expect them to be social welfare maximizers. This means they should treat each
j as equal to one, and so although managers would still take into account the prefer-
ences of the elderly, they would be less sensitive to their concerns than would mayors.
26Results using a form of government dummy (council-manager=0, mayor-council=1) are not
reported. The esimated marginal e¤ect was negative, but was not signicant.
24
This story basically plays out in the 2000 data, although the author is hesitant to
make too much of the result. In the 2000 data, the correlation on population >
65 and its square is being driven by the mayor-council cities. When the sample is
split by form of government, both forms exhibit the inverted U-shaped correlation,
but it is only signicant for mayoral cities. Pooling the samples does not lower the
standard errors, although the Chow-type test for Probit models suggets both form
of government samples should be pooled. In 1990, however, managerial cities did
exhibit the inverted U-shaped correlation and it was signicant and the 5% level,
and pooling both types of cities lowered the standard errors. The Chow-type test
indicates both form of government samples should also be pooled in 1990. While it
is di¢ cult to nd the reason for the apparent change in behavior in managerial cities,
and will have to be left for future work, this nding suggests that mayoral cities may
be more responsive to the elderly as an interest group compared to managerial cities
when it comes to emergency ambulances, and this seems to be a fairly recent trend.
4 Conclusion
This study has contributed towards the development of a political economy "make or
buy" model by incorporating politicians, voters, elections and public good production
technology into a common framework. This study has also suggested an alternative
shape for the contracting cost curve, which better ts the results of the data, and
also makes sense theoretically; namely, that while contracting costs may be convex,
there may also be important xed costs to contracting. Fixed costs are especially
important because they may be related to the "political considerations" that feature
prominently in many discussions of local public service outsourcing.
Overall, the transaction cost basis of the model is supported by the positive mar-
ginal e¤ect on w=w. Although some variables were not signicant, no signicant
variable contradicts the transaction cost basis of the model. The inverted U-shaped
nding on the population > 65 variables suggests two things. First, the presence of
a signicant correlation suggests interest group politics is an important consideration
with emergency ambulance outsourcing. Second, the inverted U-shaped correlation is
consistent with a convex contracting cost curve with xed costs. Levin and Tadelis
(2007) model the outsourcing problem with convex contracting cost curve without
xed costs; the empirical analysis here rejects this formulation. Although the con-
vexity of the contracting cost curve is supported by the data, the addition of xed
costs are required to explain the ndings here.
The convex contracting cost curve and positive xed costs model yields the fol-
lowing interpretation: if a politician needs only to provide a low level of public service
quality in order to maximize his electoral chances, then he will not nd it worthwhile
to incur the xed costs associated with outsourcing (which may be thought of as costs
associated with labor union strikes, although other interpretations are possible.) If
the politician needs to provide a moderate level of service quality to maximize his
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probability of election, the cost savings allowed by outsourcing (that are associated
with its more e¢ cient production method) outweigh the xed cost to contracting,
and the variable costs to contracting are still not high. However, if a very high level
of service quality is required to maximize the politicians electoral changes, the vari-
able contracting costs (which may include specifying, monitoring and enforcing the
contract) associated with outsourcing become increasingly important. With convex
contracting costs, in-house production will again become the cost minimizing way to
provide the service.
Future research should look at other settings beyond EMS; schools, recycling pro-
grams and public transportation projects are all areas of public policy where interest
group politics are likely to be important. These areas would be good candidates to
explore in the context of the model developed in this paper. Another direction to
consider is to improve the understanding of appropriate empirical measures of the
power of certain groups (the  s); this would shed light on an important dimension
to intergenerational voter conict. As this article demonstrates age-based interest
group politics are important in other areas of public policy, beyond the often studied
topic of social security and Medicare.
5 Appendix
5.1 Derivation of w < w
Levin and Tadelis (2007) derive the relationship w < w by postulating: a utility
function for the worker is equal to w   c(e) + (T   t) bw , where w is the wage the
worker receives upon meeting his contractual obligations, c(e) is the cost of exerting
e¤ort level e, T is the amount of time in a day, t is the amount of time the worker
spends on the job and bw is the value of the workers outside option. The worker can
turn his time and e¤ort into output according to the function q = et.
The politician has two instruments by which to contract with the worker: a per-
formance contract, which means the worker must meet the constraint q > q, and
an employment contract, where the worker must meet the constraint t > t. Their
proposition 1 shows why minimization on w will never lead to both constraints bind-
ing at the same time. The workers e¤ort is unobservable to the politician; under
an employment contract, they assume the worker has no incentive to expend e¤ort
greater than e; but e > 0. Under a performance contract, on the other hand, the
worker has an incentive to exert a higher level of e¤ort. This high powered incen-
tive is introduced with a performance contract by allowing the worker to leave the
job whenever the job is nished (i.e. whenever q  q). A worker under a perfor-
mance contract will always be willing to accept a lower wage than a worker under an
employment contract due to the formers ability to make intertemporal substitution.
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As a digression, it may be possible to extend the model presented in the main
body of the present text by incorporating these public workers into the model. As
of now they are exogenous as the workers are not di¤erentiated from those that vote,
pay taxes and consume the public good. Including public employees also represents
a way to obtain xed costs from externalities across services. Imagine an employees
outside option bw is a function of how secure public employees feel in their job, in the
sense of not being laid-o¤. Imagine further the city produces two goods. If the city
outsources production of the rst good, then the workers who produce the second
good modify their expectations of the probability they will get red at their current
city job upward. The equilibrium wage the city will have to be pay will then go up.
Politicians do not make decisions about one service in isolation and this type of cost
can be thought of as a xed cost to having a service privatized.
5.2 Derivation of equilibrium g
Equation (10) @EA
@g
=
PY
j=O 
jj
@Uj(gA)
@gA
= 0
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y
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=  wyj
y
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thus equation (10) can be rewritten as
PY
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j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j
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y
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O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O
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y
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Multiplying both sides by w yields equation (11).
Equation (12) is derived in a similar manner. For the buy case:
U j(g; j; yj; y; r; w) = (1 wg+d(g ;r)
y
)yj+j ln(g)and @U
j(gA)
@gA
=   (w+dg(g ;r))yj
y
+
j
g
and so equation (10), for the cases j = O; Y; can be rewritten as
OOO+Y Y Y
g
= (
OOyO+Y Y yY )(w+dg(g ;r))
y
>g(w + dg(g; r) =
y(OOO+Y Y Y )
(OOyO+Y Y yY )
and this is equation (12).
27
5.3 Derivation of comparative statics
The condition for both make and buy is...
gw + gdg(g; r)) =
y[Y Y +O(OO Y Y )]
[Y yY +O(OyO Y yY )]
where y = yY + O(yO   yY )
Rewriting as (y
Y +Ob)(Y Y +Oa)
Y yY +Oc
= (
Y Y yY +OayY +ObY Y +O
2
ab)
Y yY +Oc
= 

where a = (OO   Y Y ) and b = (yO   yY ) and c = (OyO   Y yY )
Comparative Static: O
@

@O
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Y +bY Y +2Oab
Y yY +Oc
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Y Y yY +OayY +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Y Y +O
2
ab)c
(Y yY +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@O
> 0 if ayY + bY Y + 2Oab >  
c
) yY a+ 
c > (yY   yO)(Y Y + 2Oa)
If O > Y ; O > Y and yO > yY then the inequality holds. However if O > Y ;
O > Y but yO < yY then the term on the left hand side is still positive as long
as OyO   Y yY  0 and the equality will be true whenever the di¤erence between
yY   yO is small, and the di¤erence between OO   Y Y is large. Thus, in a
nutshell, as long as O > Y ; O > Y are true, then the comparative static will still
be positive as long as yO is not that much less than yY :
For example, consider the case when yO = 0: The CS is positive when a(1 2O) >
Y (Y + 
) which holds when Y is small and when O is not too big; in the data
used here, no city had a percent of elderly voters near .5.
Comparative Static: O
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5.4 Data Appendix: JEMS Data Set
Data for the JEMS data set comes from annual surveys conducted by the Journal of
Emergency Medical Service. They survey the 200 largest cities in the U.S. A typical
entry includes the following information: the name of the city and a list of every
provider serving that community. In addition, next to the name of each provider, it
reports the type of provider (categories include one through nine below) and whether
it provides transport versus rst responding service to the community (or both).
Respondents to the JEMS survey had a list of nine choices to choose from (JEMS
1990) need to use 1991 and include page number:
 (1 - Fire Department) Fire-department-based responders trained as both re-
ghters and EMTs, using the either the same personnel to perform both re
protection and EMS, or di¤erent personnel to provide both services.
 (2 - 3rd service, municipal) Funded and operated by municipal government
(utilizing local government employees) and not administered by the re or police
department
 (3 - 3rd service, county) Funded and operated by the county government (using
county government employees) and not administered by a law-enforement or
re-protection agency
 (4 - Public Trust) A quasi-governmental entity that operates an ambulance
system using its own employees.
 (5 - Hospital-Based) A hospital owned and operated ambulance service
 (6 - Private) A privately owned company or corporation engaged in the provision
of medical transportation
 (7 - Public Utility Model) A regulated-monopoly ambulance system that selects
the exclusive provider based on a competitive procurement process. These sys-
tems are usually single-tiered, providing emergency and non-emergency service
with an all-advanced-life-saving eet. Commonly, a quasi-governmental entity
supervises the contract and performs billing/collection services
 (8 - Volunteer) A volunteer agency provides EMS
 (9 - Police) Funded and operated by municipal government (utilizing local gov-
ernment employees) and administered by the police department
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Table 7 Cities use of EMS transport delivery mode, by year 1990 2000
Fire department 54 63
Private 52 61
Third service (municipal) 15 10
Multiple private 13 4
Third service (county) 8 8
Hospital 8 7
Fire department w/ contractor 5 5
Public utility model 5 7
Public trust 3 0
Multiple hospital 2 0
Third service (county) w/ contractor 1 2
Volunteer 1 1
Volunteer w/ private 1 0
Police department 1 1
note: data from both years were pooled to include only cities that appear in both
years
Items 1-2 and 9 were coded as "make" with the remaining six coded as "buy,"
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5.5 Classifying Cities as "mayor-council" versus "council man-
ager"
Form of government data comes from two sources: For 1992, Census of Governments,
Organization Phase, and for 2007 was provided to the author by ICMA. When these
data indicated a city switched form of government, the following rule was used to
ensure accuracy of form of government data:
1. Treat ICMA data as correct, and count commissionforms as mayor-council
2. Treat Census data as correct when it classies a city as council-manager
3. Be suspicious of Census data that classies a city as mayor-council; except
when it can be veried through Google searches, as in the case of Sioux Falls,
Chattanooga and El Paso. Label these cities as council-manager.
Google searches, telephone calls and researching city charters shows these rules
are consistent with the available evidence. Using these rules makes sense for the
following reasons. 1.) Knowing form of government data is ICMAs core competency.
Also, city webpages veried all the ICMA categorizations were correct, except those of
commission.However, in these cases, city webpages (as well as telephone calls to city
o¢ cials) revealed all switchers labeled as commissionform were actually mayor-
councilform. 2.) mayor-councilcities are more di¢ cult to correctly classify than
council-manager 3.) Due to the di¤erence between weak mayors and strong
mayorsit makes sense to classify a switcher Census data labels as mayor-council
as council-manager especially because many Google searches and telephone calls
verify that the Census data is often wrong on these classications. However, Google
searches reveal that the Census is sometimes right, so it make sense to keep the
classication the same in these cases. These three cities were veried to switch from
mayor council to council manager. The rest of the cities could not be veried as having
switched and in fact several were veried to not have switched with the help of ICMA
employee Martha Perego, who was of great assistance and accessed the ICMAs city
charter database on the authors behalf. For these cities, council-manageris used as
form of government. The likely reason for why most switchers listed as mayor-council
were incorrect is the di¤erence between a weak mayorand strong mayor.
The problem with this technique is that it will not catch cities that switched
from council-manager to mayor-council; that is, some cities could still be incorrectly
classied as mayor-council in 1987 even though they were council-manager cities, as
they would not have shown up as switchers. However, as few cities switch form of
government from year to year, this problem is not likely to be large.
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5.6 State Laws and Outsourcing
Table 8 below presents results of the baseline regressions with the USACIR state law
dummies. The state law dummies are included separately and together as it is not
clear that the presence of one law weakens the e¤ects of other laws.
Table 8 Largest 200 U.S. cities, 1990
Dep. variable: mode, buy = 1, marginal e¤ects reported, std errors in ( )
pop65 8.205

7.182

8.079

8.569

8.422

9.134

8.461

8.781

8.491

8.311

(3 .66) (3 .53) (3 .54) (3 .66) (3 .58) (3 .63) (3 .56) (3 .61) (3 .58) (3 .57)
p op65sq -21.09

-18.71

-20.66

-22.53

-21 .95

-25 .02

-22 .25

-22 .83

-21 .98

-21 .71

(10.6) (10.0) (10.1) (10.6) (10.2) (10.4) (10.1) (10.3) (10.2) (10.2)
log(p op) -0 .172

-0 .180

-0 .171

-0 .175

-0 .175

-0 .176

-0 .173

-0 .174

-0 .173

-0 .182

(0 .051) (0 .050) (0 .051) (0 .051) (0 .051) (0 .052) (0.051) (0 .051) (0 .051) (0 .051)
log(hvalue) 0 .266

0.279

0.274

0.267

0.268

0.266

0.242

0.269

0.275

0.261

(0 .077) (0 .077) (0 .077) (0 .078) (0 .078) (0.077) (0.081) (0 .077) (0 .080) (0 .077)
debt lim it 0 .0323 0.110
(0.11) (0 .14)
b orrow ing 0.260

0.253

(0 .076) (0 .080)
standards -0 .146

-0 .133
(0.077) (0 .085)
take over 0.0194 0.0665
(0.12) (0 .14)
balanced budget 0.0269 -0.0251
(0.13) (0 .18)
state assess 0 .159** 0.187**
(0.080) (0.093)
m erit -0 .0691 -0 .0646
(0.074) (0 .081)
no strike -0 .156 -0 .168
(0.20) (0 .22)
no pol activ ity -0 .0298 -0.0362
(0.073) (0 .083)
Pseudo R2
LL
***, ** and * denote sign icant at 1% , 5% and 10% level, resp ectively, w ith
appropriate test statistics
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